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Participative Budgeting and Participant Motivation: A Review of the
Literature
Abstract

In their discussion - Participative Budgeting and Participant Motivation: A Review of the Literature - by
Frederick J. Demicco, Assistant Professor, School of Hotel, Restaurant and Institutional Management, The
Pennsylvania State University and Steven J. Dempsey, Fulton F. Galer, Martin Baker, Graduate Assistants,
College of Business at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, the authors initially observe: “In
recent years behavioral literature has stressed the importance of participation In goal-setting by those most
directly affected by those goals. The common postulate is that greater participation by employees in the
various management functions, especially the planning function, will lead to improved motivation,
performance, coordination, and functional behavior. The authors analyze this postulate as it relates to the
budgeting process and discuss whether or not participative budgeting has a significant positive impact on the
motivations of budget participants.”
In defining the concept of budgeting, the authors offer: “Budgeting is usually viewed as encompassing the
preparation and adoption of a detailed financial operating plan…” In furthering that statement they also
furnish that budgeting’s focus is to influence, in a positive way, how managers plan and coordinate the
activities of a property in a way that will enhance their own performance. In essence, framing an organization
within its described boundaries, and realizing its established goals. The authors will have you know, to control
budget is to control operations.
What kind of parallels can be drawn between the technical methods and procedures of budgeting, and
managerial behavior? “In an effort to answer this question, Ronen and Livingstone have suggested that a
fourth objective of budgeting exists, that of motivation,” say the authors with attribution. “The managerial
function of motivation is manipulative in nature.”
Demicco, Dempsey, Galer, and Baker attempt to quantify motivation as a psychological premise using the
expectancy theory, which encompasses empirical support, intuitive appeal, and ease of application to the
budgetary process. They also present you with House's Path-Goal model; essentially a mathematics type
formula designed to gauge motivation. You really need to see this.
The views of Argyris are also explored in particular detail. Although, the Argyris study was primarily aimed at
manufacturing firms, and the effects on line-supervisors of the manufacturing budgets which were used to
control and evaluate their performance, its application is relevant to the hospitality industry. As the title
suggests, other notables in the field of behavioral motivation theory, and participation are also referenced.
“Behavioral theory has been moving away from models of purported general applicability toward contingency
models that are suited for particular situations,” say the authors in closing. “It is conceivable that some time in
the future, contingency models will make possible the tailoring of budget strategies to individual budget
holder personalities.”
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In recent years behavioral literature has stressed the importance of participation in goal-setting by those most directly affected by those goals.
The common postulate is that greater participation by employees in the
various management functions, especially the planning function, will lead
to improved motivation, performance, coordination, and functional
behavior. The authors analyze this postulate as it relates to the budgeting
process and discuss whether or not participative budgeting has a significant positive impact on the motivations of budget participants.

Budgeting occupies a central position in the design and operation
of most management accountingsystems. Almost regardless of the type
of organization, the nature of its problems, and the other means for influencing behavior, the preparation of a quantitative statement of expectations regarding the allocationof the organization'sresources tends
to be seen as an essential feature of administrative control. Nevertheless,
despite its wide acceptance,budgetingremains one of the most intriguing and perplexing of management accountingprocedures. With many
fundamental questions remaining unsolved, it provides an ideal focus
for considering some of the social and human factors which influence the
operation of accounting systems in complex organizations.
Budgeting is usually viewed as encompassingthe preparation and
adoption of a detailed financial operating plan, the comparison of the
results of actual operations with those set forth in the plan, and an
analysis and evaluation of the reasons for deviations from the plan. The
objectiveof budgeting is to successfully influence how managers plan,
coordinate, and control the activities of the company so that better
managerialperformance may result. In other words, a budget serves to
map out the movement of an organization over a given time span so that
it remains within established boundaries and yields the attainment of
desired goals.
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The planning function associatedwith the budget aims to quantify
and assemblerelevant data so that members of the organizationwill have
specific, activity-directed goals to guide them. Planning is facilitated
because the budget-setters must be aware of the goals and objectives
of the organization and of the programs of activity necessary to their
attainment.' The anticipated consequences of different combinationsof
plans made by management and the influences of the environment are,
as far as possible, reflected in the budget. The planning function is also
enhanced by the degree of objectivity and formalization of forecasting
necessary in preparation of the budget.
Coordination of the factors of production necessary to achieve the
desired goals is improved if there are accurately developed budgets for
the varying activities of the organization. The budget offers a formal
statement of the planned operationsof the firmand provides a basis upon
which these activities can be related to each other.
Controlover the operations of the organization is also enhanced as
the budget provides a basis upon which the activitiesof the firm can be
assessed. Amendments to the budget may have to be made in the light
of changingsituationsor circumstances,but it remains a yardstick upon
which management may gauge the effectiveness of operations in respect
to their contribution to the predetermined objectives and goals of the
firm. The control function of evaluation, comparison, analysis of deviation from plans, correctiveaction, and feedback depend to a significant
degree on the initial formal expression of the desired levels of activity
(i.e., budget).
Even though the objective of budgeting is to influencemanagerial
behavior-how managers plan, coordinate,and control the activities of
the company-our present knowledge of the mechanism through which
or by which budgetinginfluences that behavior is, at best, incomplete.
Therehave beenvery few attempts to describe budgetingin behavioral
terms. Most budgeting and managerial accountingtextbooks describe
budgetingin terms of arelatively well-defined set of technical methods
and procedures. Yet, how do these methods and procedures influence
managerial behavior? In an effort to answer this question, Ronen and
Livingstonehave suggested that a fourth objective of budgeting exists,
that of m~tivation.~
Budgeting Can Determine Motivation
The managerial function of motivation is manipulative in nature.
In this functionalrole, management seeks to define the environmentin
such a way as to ensure that subordinates do what is desired of them.
In short, management desires a reasonably high level of predictive accuracy that subordinateswill act in a way that leads to successful achieve
ment of their work goals. Some of the devices that are used toward this
end are job descriptions, procedures, rules, policies, persuasion, and
budget. As such,management attempts to provide a seriesof constraints,
pressures, or what otherwise might be regarded as conditions to obtain
desired performance.
The term "motivation" has a different meaning psychologically.
Barelson and Steiner3have defined the term as being an "inner state

FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 6, Number 1, 1988
Copyright: Contents © 1987 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any artwork,
editorial, or other material is expressly prohibited without written permission from
the publisher.

[that]energizes, activates, or moves...directs or channelsbehavior toward
goals. In short, a motive results in and hence can be inferred from purposive means-end behavior."
Although a host of intuitively appealingtheories of motivation exist in the behavioralliterature, the one possessing the best combination
of intuitive appeal, empirical support, and ease of application to the
budgetaryprocess is "expectancy theory." The basic tenet of expectancy
theory is that an individual chooses his behavior on the basis of his expectations that the behavior will result in a specificoutcome, and the sum
of valences (i.e.,personal utilities or satisfaction) that he derives from
the outcome. Several forms of expectancy theory have appeared in the
literature; however, particularly applicable to the budgeting area is
House's Path-Goal model,4 which has enjoyed substantial empirical
support in general5 and in the budgeting area in particular.6 The model
takes the following form:
n

M = I V ~ +P, [IV, +C(P,,EV,)I ( i = 1,2, ... , n )
where: M = motivation to work
IV, = intrinsic valence associated with goal-directed
behavior
IVa = intrinsic valence associated with work goal
accomplishment
EV, = extrinsic valences associated with work goal
accomplishment
PI = path instrumentality of behavior for work goal
attainment
P, = path instrumentality of work goal for extrinsic
valences
Intrinsic rewards are those that are mediated within theindividual, such
as feelings of satisfaction or competence. On the other hand, extrinsic
rewards are those that are mediated outside of the individual, such as
pay, promotion, or peer recognition.
There are actually two levels of outcomes which are important in
the theory. First level outcomes are the direct result of an individual
engaging in a certain behavior, and amount to specific levels of output
or performance, such as achievinga certain budgeted level of profits. The
perceived level of probability of a certain behavior resulting in a certain
first level outcome is represented by P, in the model.
Second level outcomes are those that depend to some extent on the
occurrence of specific first level outcomes, such as receiving a bonus or
promotion due to meeting the budgeted profit level. The value of these
outcomes to the individual is represented by EV, in the model. The
perceived probability that a specificfirst level outcome will be followed
by a specificsecond level outcome is represented by P, in the model. I t
is interestingto note that the achievement of first level outcomes is direct-
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lyrewarding only to the extent that goal accomplishmentis found to be
rewarding. A manager places no direct value other than positive internal satisfactions on the achievement of the budgeted profit goal. The
manager is really after those second level outcomes that he values and
that are dependent in some part on the achievement of a first level
outcome-whether he will receive them or not.
Individuals may, however, find working toward budgeted ends
rewarding in itself (IV, in the model);they may also find that budgeted
goal attainment is rewarding in itself (IV, in the model). As internal
valences, these are not associated with external rewards, but are related
to such internal factors as feelings of self-worthand esteem. Positive feelingsof achievement and competencemay follow the achievementof goals.
Budget holders also may believe that the achievement of first level outcomes will improve their chances of receiving valued second level outcomes, such as bonuses or pay raises.
Accordingto the model, then, individualsengagein budget-directed
behavior because they gain some satisfaction from the behavior itself,
experiencerewarding feelings following the act of attaining the budget,
andlor improvetheir chances of being recipients of secondlevel outcomes.
Shift Occurs in Budgetary Philosophy

One of the first behavioral scientists to express an interest in the
nature and consequences of the budget process was Argyris.7 In an investigation conducted more than 30 years ago, he studied the budgeting
practices of several industrial firms. Argyris' primary concern was to
determine the effects on line supervisors of the manufacturing budgets
which were used to control and evaluate their performance. His conclusions may be summarized as follows:
Budget staff viewed their role as essentially one of criticism.They
considered themselves "watchdogs" whose principal function was
to constantly search for budget deviations to report to top
management.
Line supervisors were evaluated on the basis of reports that included only results without explanations. Unfavorablevariances
were highlighted, but no attempt was made to explain whether
the causes of the variances were avoidable or unavoidable.
Accountants were considered inflexible. They were reluctant to
change budget standards as conditions changed.
Budget staff was viewed as never satisfied and constantly applying pressure for ever increasing goals.
The budgets were unrealistic. They were purposely kept so high
that they were impossible to meet.
In analyzingthe behavioral relationships observed in the firms under
study, Argyris states that the core of the problem was undue pressure
caused by the opinion of both top management and the accounting staff
that the employeeswere inherently lazy. As a consequenceof budget practices that reflected their opinion, the accountingsystem was looked upon
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with great suspicion and distrust, and there was a general feeling of
hostility, and conflict between line supervisors and accountants. Furthermore, production employees banded together in groups to find ways
of protecting themselves from the accounting system. A substantial
amount of effort was spent in attempts to fix blame, and everyone was
concerned with making a good showing by meeting budgets regardless
of what this meant in terms of the best interests of the firm. Finally, due
to the nature of the situation, the accountants were placed in a position
where their success depended on discovering failure in others.
There is no way of determining the extent to which budget practices
described by Argyris were in general use at the time of his study. Nor
is there any reliable evidence concerning the degree of such practices to
day. Therecan belittledoubt, however, that the blatant attempts touse
budgets as coercive pressure devices, as well as "watchdog" attitudes
on the part of accountants, have severely declined. The dramatic shift
in managerial philosophy over the past 30 years from that of a Theory
X to Theory Y orientation has no doubt had profound impacts on
budgetary practices. One notable reflection of this shift has been the adop
tion by many firms of participative management techniques, in particular, participative budgeting.
Participative Budgeting Affects Motivation
Mitchell8 has described four ways in which participative decision
making wouldimpact upon subordinatemotivation as predicted by expectancy theory. First, a participativeclimate would increase the clarity of organizational contingencies. Through participation in decision
making, subordinates would gain an increased understandingof the relationship between behaviors and outcomes. Second,subordinates would
select goals they highly value. I t is logical that if one participatesin decisions about various goals, this individual would select goals he or she
wants. Third, because participation increases the control one has over
valued outcomes,greater instrumentalities will be assigned to those outcomes. Finally, when people participate in the decision process, they
become more egeinvolved; the decisionsmade are in somepart their own.
This increasesthe intrinsicvalences associated with both goal-directed
behavior and work goal accomplishment. Participative strategies are
therefore consistent with House's Path-Goalformulationof the expectancy model.
As applied to budgeting, participation means allowingindividuals
who will be responsible for performance under a budget to participate
in the decisions by which the budget is established. ArgyrisQhas cautioned, however, that for participative budgeting to be effective, it must
be genuine. The individualsinvolved must be allowed to be spontaneous
and free in their discussion, and not feel pressured to simply sanction
management's plans.
According to Caplanlo, the advantages to be derived from participative budgeting are that it helps provide operating managers with
a sense of challengeand responsibility,and increases the probability that
the goals of the budget willbe "internalized" by those involved;that is,
that they will accept budget goals as their own. To these may be added
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the presumed benefit that budgeted figuresaremore likely to reflect reality since they are generated by those who are knowledgeable of unit
operations.
Becker and Green" were some of the first to address the participationissue as it relates to budgeting. Their approach to participation was
in terms of its effects on group dynamics. In this regard they speak of
two dimensions of group behavior that determine the ultimate effect of
a participative budgeting strategy, process, and content. Process is defined as the act of participating, along with the attendant consequencesof
that act; content is the "discussion topic" toward which are generated
the positive or negative attitudes. According to Becker and Green, the
act of participation enables the participants within the budgeted group
(i.e., a division, responsibility center, or other budgetary unit) to interact
and communicate with one another, thereby creating a high degree of
group cohesiveness. This cohesiveness, if coupled with group norms
favorable to the organization(favorablegroup content),is conducive to
higher levels of performance.
Theseparticular effectsof participationcan be accommodatedwithin
the expectancy model framework. A group is cohesive when the individual members value their acceptance within the group. Participation in the context of a cohesive group would be a process of reaching
consensus within the group on desirable standards of performance for
the group. Once such a consensus has been reached as a result of the
group's participation, it would be viewed by the individualmembers as
reflecting the group's own norm. Striving to attain the agreed-upongoal
(budget)would, therefore, increase the individual's likelihood of maintaining his acceptance in the group. In terms of the Path-Goal Model,
the existence of a cohesive group of which the subordinate is a member
enhances the extrinsic valence associated with work-goal accomplishment. With the attainment of the budget, the individual achieves not
only the extrinsic and intrinsic valences that exist in the absence of a
group context but, in addition, he maintains his acceptancein a cohesive
group that can be regarded as an extrinsicvalence dissociatedwith work
goal accomplishment.
It can be seen, then, bothin terms of Becker and Green's arguments
and in terms of the expectancy model, that participation is likely to increasemotivation to achieve the budget only when groups are cohesive
and group content is supportive of the organization.
Is Participation a Panacea?
The general debate on participation is one of the most significant
and contentious debates of our time. The increasing number who are
stressing the need for further participation are vitally concerned with
greater human welfare, and are generally interested in internally
generated change over externally imposed change. Others, however,
severelyquestionthe wisdom of such an approach, pointingout that participation, though perhaps conduciveto greater human developmentand
fulfillment, does not necessarily lead to the attainment of outcomes in
the best interest of the organization.
Muchis heard of Theory X versus Theory Y, people versus organiza-
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tion, democratic versus autocratic style, and now, participation versus
imposed control.12Arguments for the first comparative are often accepted as welcomed relief to the "Tayloristic" organizationsof old, and,
given the picture presented by Argyris' 1952 study, it would seem that
such arguments are indeed valid, that they will result in more productive organizations that are more enjoyable places to work. If manage
ment were only to participate in making organizationaldecisions,their
satisfactionand senseof autonomy would increase. They would see the
decisions as their decisions. They would feel involved in the organization and their involvementwould be translated into renewed enthusiasm
and heightened motivation to be productive. Everyone,in other words,
would be in the best of all possible worlds.
Unfortunately, the transition from the aforementioned a priori
arguments to empiricalresearch results is not easily made. It is an even
bigger step to make that transition with respect to participative
budgeting. Much of the problem stems from the definition of the dependent variable(s)to be studied. We would like, of course, to understand
the causalrelationship between participative budgeting and the promotion of organizationalobiectives,the latter usually considered embracing the productive beha&or of organization members. Unfortunately,
because there are so many variables in addition to participation that bear
upon and moderate performance (e.g., abilities, perceptions, and environmental constraints),it becomes a practical difficulty to empirically test for such direct relationships. Instead, most research deals with
the effects of participation on participant attitudes, such as work motivation, satisfaction,and involvement. This point is extremely important
when consideringresearchresults. The key, yet perhaps invalid, assumption behind positive findings in these studies is that there is a positive
causal linkbetween participant attitudes and organizationalobjectives.
It is precisely this point on which many base their arguments against
participation schemes.
Hopwoodl3 for example, has stressed that participative techniques
may in fact lead to dysfunctionalbehavior. Paraphrasinghis arguments,
participative budgetingis akin to handingparticipants a6'blankcheck"
with which they will satisfy their self-servinginterests at the expense
of the organization. Stedryl4 cites several studies that lend support to
such a proposition. For example, he notes a study done by Leavitt15
suggested that in avariety of situationsleaderswho remain distant and
aloof from their subordinatesare more successfulthan their counterparts
who form close personal ties with their work groups. Morse and
Reimer16found that participation groups experience higher levels of
satisfaction and job involvement,but do not necessarily translate those
feelings into concomitant increases in productivity.
These studies simply point to the need to address the participation
issue with closer scrutiny. Inconsistenciesin the literatureareextensive,
suggesting that it is extremely dangerousto generalizethe results of one
of a few studies to all situations. The practical problem becomes one of
identifying which conditional factors determine the wider impact of a
particular type of participative management program. In considering
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the review of research which follows, this point should be borne in mind.
The results are certainly not universally applicable, nor should they be
construed as constituting evidence in support of one general argument
over another.
Research Seeks to Understand Motivation
I t was noted earlier that the primary objectives of most profitdirected organizations relate to performance and productivity. I t was
also mentioned that due to methodological problems associated with
measuringperformance variables(especiallyin the ranks of management
generally responsible for meeting budgets), management attitudes are
frequently studied instead. There are, of course, other reasons for studying attitudes, such as a genuine concern for employee social welfare.
However, it is safe to assume that the primary concern in a budgeting
context is to gain an understanding of the attitudinal effects on productive behavior.
A postulate of much behavioral research is that productive behavior
is determined in large part by the internal (attitudinal)force, motivation.
Because surrogates for motivation are relatively easy to measure,I7and
because of motivation's presumed effect on observed behavior, it is fre
quently studied as a dependent variable in the budgeting research. I t
was therefore deemed appropriate to concentrate on motivation in the
research review in order to gain as much understandingas possible about
the more exclusive qualitative variable of performance, and keep the
review to a manageable size. Also considered are studies that attempted to measure performance directly.
One of the most significant studies dealing with the relationshipbetween participative budgeting and motivation was done by Stedry.18 It
is of interest both because of its findings and because it represents one
of the earliest attempts to apply the methodology of laboratory experimentation to research in accounting.19 The experiment involved approximately 100university students perforrningproblem-solvingtasks.
These students were divided into four groups based on the difficulty of
the budget that they were given: low budget, medium budget, high
budget, and implicit budget (nospecific budget standard given).Stedry
found that budget difficulty appearedtoinfluencemotivation,the highest
motivation corresponding to the students with the implicit budget,
followed by the medium, high, and low budget groups, in that order.
Each of the four groups was further divided into three subgroups.
In one subgroup, the subjects were given the budget and then asked to
indicate what they hoped to accomplish, in effect to set their aspiration
levels. As perBecker and Green, aspiration level has been defined in the
psychological literature as a goal that when just barely achieved has
associated withit subjective feelings of success, when not achieved, subjective feelings of failure. Note, then, that aspiration refers to goals,
whereas motivation is the attitudinal force that drives one toward goal
attainment. In another subgroup, the students were requested to indicate
their aspiration levels before they were given the budget. The third
subgroup was not asked to establish aspiration levels at all. The results
suggest that a significant interrelationshipexistsbetween budget levels,
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aspirationlevels, and motivation. For example, the highest motivation
was in the high budget group that set its aspiration levels after receiving the budget. However,the high budget group that set its levels before
receiving the budget showed the poorest performance of all the groups.
One possible interpretation of these findings is that when the subjects
established their aspiration levels after receiving their budgets, the
aspiration levels tended to reflect the performance objectives contained in the budget. In other words, when aspiration levels were set first,
the budget goalsrepresented a separate and conflicting level which the
subjects were unwilling to accept.
Severalspecificpoints are worth noting about this important study.
First, low budgets were usually associated with very low motivation;
second, implicit budgets were in general associated with high motivation; and, third, the influence of aspiration levels on motivation varied
depending on budget difficulty and on whether the aspiration levels were
established before or after the budget was received. The participation
schema is therefore strongly supported by Stedry's results.
Bryan and Locke20approached the study of participation and
motivation from a different standpoint. Instead of taking subjects initially similar in motivation level and then manipulatingthem to create
differences,they selectedsubjectsinitially differentin motivation level
and employed experimental procedures directed toward making them
similar. Their finding was that groups initially low in motivation performedbetterwhen given specific goals rather than allowed to participate
in goal setting. This is contrary to Stedry 's results which suggest that
all individuals be allowed to participate,regardless of initial motivation
levels. Thus, even though participation may increasemotivation levels
of all motivation types, the marginal increase in motivation for groups
initially low in motivation may be greater if goals are imposed by the participatory process.
Job Performance Is Not Affected
Other studies supportingthe hypothesizedrelationship between participative budgeting and motivation include Hofstede,21Searfoss and
Monczka,22 and Swieringa and M0ncur.~3
Two other studies found that
participation is positively associated with higher levels of motivation
to meet the budget and with budget achievement." However, although
participation tended to improvebudgetaryperformance,it was unrelated
to overall job performance. This finding leads to an intriguing issue in
the area of performance measurement utilizing budget information.The
issue is of concern because of its possible consequences on managerial
motivations when their performanceisevaluated on the basis of budget
deviations.
Otleyz investigated the relationship between performance and the
manner in which budget information is used to evaluate performance.
He found that when a degree of variation from budget was used to assess
performance, budgets were closely met (i.e.,budgetary performance was
favorable). However, when performance evaluation was based on
qualitativefactors other than budgeted standards, thedegree of budget
variation was considerable. On considering this issue, Otley hypothesized
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that the major reason for performance being closer to budget when
budgetary means of evaluation are stressed is not so much that performance improves,but that the budget is set at more realistic levels. Further examination of this suspicion yielded the followinginterestingconclusion: Where aunit was thought likely to achieve alevel of profit that
would be acceptable to senior management, its budget was set at that
level; however, where the level of profit expected for a unit was perceived to be unacceptable to senior management, its budget was biased in
an optimisticdirection so as to yield a more acceptable profit budget and
thereby pacify senior management. In the latter situation,collusion took
place between the budget holders and their immediate superiors. Animplicit agreement existed that superiors would evaluate budget holders
on the basis of qualitative factors rather than on quantitative budget
information.
Motivations Influenced by Self-Interest

The implication of this finding is that motivations will be directed
toward that which furthers individual self-interest.This is consistent
with what is suggested by the Path-Goal Model. If individuals are
evaluated on the basis of budget variances (asecond-leveloutcomewith
negative valence),they will be motivated toward biasing budget information in an effort to reduce the probability of unfavorable variances
taking place. If individuals are allowed to participate in setting their own
budget goals, this biasing is readily facilitated.
Theintentional biasing of budget information in order to promote
self-interestis perhaps the greatest potential problem associated with
participative budgeting. Schiff and Lewin26 have suggested that the
process of preparing the budget is highly instrumental in resolving conflict among the various participants regarding organizationalgoals and
resource allocation commitment. In other words, a bargaining process
is saidto take place, the end result beinga contracted compromisewherein
dissonance between organizationand personal goals is minimized. These
personal goals consist of higher salaries,bonuses, and the like, which can
be realized if the budget is attainable (secondlevel outcomeswith positive
valence).
According to Williarns,m,such compromises are achievable only in
an environment that acquiesces to the existence of organizational
"slack." Cyert and March28 define organizational slack as the difference
between the total resources availableto the firm and the totalnecessary
to maintain the organization coalition. As the term is usedin budgeting,
slack refers to the intentional understatement of revenues and overstate
ment of costs. The implication is that managers consciously and intentionally bargain for slack in the budgetary process in order to achieve
personal goals concurrently with organizational goals.
In a study of the behavioral variables influencing budget slack creation, Onsi29 found that slack is most prevalent in organizationsdescribed as having an autocratic style of management. He stated that, if an
organization expects a manager to do no more than what the organization's formal control system compels him to do (TheoryX), he is most
likely to use budgetary slack to fulfill personal goals not necessarily rele
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vant to the company's performance. From his findings, Onsi proposes
that participation, which is a democratic process, leads to less need to
create slack becausethere is a good likelihoodthat within suchdemocratic
system managers can satisfy personal goals without being underhanded with the budget. This, he suggests,is areasonableconclusion because
participation was found to result in favorable attitudes, and favorable
attitudes were not associated with slack creation.
Unfortunately, such reasoning is highly tenuous. For one, Onsi's
research was based on simple correlations which in and of themselves
areincapableof sayinganything about the direction of causality. Skondly, this proposalruns counter to Otley's appealingresults which, as noted,
suggest that participation is more rather than less, likely to result in
budget manipulation. Although it may indeed be true that slack has
greater prevalence in autocraticorganizations than in democratic ones,
it does not follow that participativetechniques are the cause for reduced slack creation,the incentivefor which is moderated by other variables.
Further research is necessary in this area before more conclusive
generalizations can be made.
Moderating Variables Broaden the Context
Participative budgeting is used and managers are motivated in a
broader context. In order to understand more fully the relationshipbetween participative budgeting and these motivations, the analysis must
be extended to include three additional variables which, when taken
together, represent this broader context. Thesevariables include themore
enduring states or characteristics of the organization, the personal
characteristics of the organization members, and the interpersonalrelationships between them. For purposes of exposition,these variables are
cataloguedhere as organization structure, management style, and personality attributes.
Organizational Structure Influences Benefits
Although the literature is in general agreement that participative
budgeting induces motivation, it is unlikely that participation tactics
operate equivalentlyin all environments.The beneficial aspects of aparticipative budgeting program appear to be a function of the organizational structure within which it operates.
Although there has been only limited empirical work studying the
direct relationship between organizational structure and participation,
someimportant conclusionsmay be reached. Additionally,there are important ramifications concerningthe fact that the environment,which
can be controlled,affects the successof the participative budgeting p r e
cess. Through environmental manipulation, motivation may increase
due to the enhancing effect of the participative program.
There are two basic organization control structures common to
business settings. The first, the decentralized structure, is characterized by an environmentin which activities are specialized,formalized,and
clearlydefined. Areas of responsibility and authority are wellestablished
and control is essentially impersonal. The primary features of this type
of control system are the degree of structuredactivities and the organization's regulation of intended pr0cesses.3~
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The alternative to this structure of control is to centralize decision
authority at higher levels of the organization, thus vesting power in a
few individuals in top management positions. In this environment interpersonal relationships replace structured activities as a primary means
for maintaining control. Child3l has shown that because the control of
authority is vested in a small group of people in charge of the organization, perceived control by individualsin the lower level of the organization is reduced.
Bruns and Waterhouse32 demonstrated that the psychological effect of greater organizational structure would result in an increased
perception of controlon the part of executives.Relating this data to participative budgeting, it was hypothesized that the structuring of activities in a decentralized organization would lead to higher levels of
perceived control and would also result in greater participation in
budgeting. (Note that their study addressed participation as a dependent variable rather than as an independent variable; in other words, their
study was looking at how much "participation" was taking place in the
participative budgeting program that existed.)The finding of their study
was that perceived controlwas an interveningvariable between organizational structure and participation. People in highly structured, decentralized organizations participated more in the budgetary process
because they perceived themselves as exercising more control.
Different circumstanceswere found to exist in centralized organizations. The lack of autonomy and the existence oi"powervested in a few
resulted in individuals perceiving themselves as having more interaction with superiors and subordinates on budget-relatedmatters; that is,
subordinateswere more often required to explain to their superiors their
reasons for budget variances. The study also showed, however, that the
lack of autonomy in a centralized organization resulted in a reduction
in interaction between superiors and subordinates in budget preparation and in methods used to achieve the budget. As a result, budgets in
a centralized organization appear to be a potential source of pressure.
Similar results have been found by Merchant.33 He investigated
how differencesin corporatebudgeting systems arerelated to corporate
size, diversity, and degree of decentralization, and how different choices
in system design and use are related to, among other things, manager
motivation. The results indicate that larger, more diverse, decentralized firms tend to use budgetingin an administrativemanner with greater
importance placed on achieving budget plans, and greater middle
management participation in budget-relatedactivities. Intrinsic motivation was foundto be higher where managersparticipatedin the budgeting
process.
From these studies, it may be inferred that the characteristics of a
centralized organizationare not conducive to the participative process.
In terms of the Path-GoalModel, theinstrumentalities associatedwith
valued outcomes are diminisheddueto theretention of control at upper
management levels.
Management Styles Have an Effect

closely related to the aboveis the extent to which the management
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of a company can be considered to be authoritarian.
argued
that authoritariansand people with little need for independence areunaffected by the opportunity to participate in decision making. He undertook a study of first, second, and third line supervisorsin a delivery company in which he investigated the effect of personal independence needs
and authoritarianism upon participation and job satisfaction. The
positive correlation that he found between perceived participation, job
satisfaction, and job motivation was even greater for supervisors with
high independence needs and few authoritarian tendencies.
Fox35 has argued that employees who have been conditioned to anticipate and accept authoritarian management are likely to be somewhat
disconcerted by rapid changeto participation in decision making. This,
he suggests, could cause them to become suspicious that management
may be still simply trying to further its own ends under a new guise.
Becker and Green36 argue that when department heads participate in
setting budgets and then find that higher management rejects their proposals, they will hold negative attitudes toward management. A further
problem with participativedecision making in an authoritarian company,
accordingto Becker and Green, is the tendency to adhere to rigid status
differences so that persons of higher status stillretaingreater influence
over decisions.
Hofstede3Ideduced that in organizations where there are more
non-authoritarians,personnel have more positive attitudes toward the
budgetary system and that participation makes standards much more
relevant for personnel. He further deduced that in organizations occupied
by an authoritarian majority, personnel are often at first resistant to the
use of standards, although this may gradually disappear if they participate in budget setting.
From these observations, it appears that personnel acclimated to
an authoritarian management style will, ingeneral, show little desire to
participate in budget planning, and may, in fact, resist its introduction.
Personality Attributes Determine Satisfaction
Research by B r ~ w n e lhas
l ~ ~shown that the relationship between
budgetary participation and motivation is moderated by the personality variable locus of control. His findings suggest that participation is
most effective, both in terms of motivation and satisfaction, for "internals" (those individuals who feel that they are in control of their own
destinies).By contrast, individualscharacterized as "externals" (those
who attribute the results of their actions to chance, luck, or fate)are more
motivated under conditions of low participation, that is, when budget
goals are imposed on them. This finding may also help explain why
authoritarians are content with imposed goals. I t is reasonablethat externals are drawn to organizations employing authoritarian practices,
and therefore the effects actually captured in the abovementioned
studies would have been due to subjects possessing external personalities. This, of course,is merely a conjecturalstatement, and requires
empirical testing.
Swieringa and M o n ~ u studied
r ~ ~ eight personality variables as
they condition the relationship between participative budgeting and,
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among other things, motivation. These variables were cautiousness,
original thinking, personal relations, vigor, ascendency,responsibility,
emotional stability, and sociability.The results of their analysis revealed that emotional stability and cautiousness were the most important
predictors of motivation to meet the budget. However, their conclusions
also suggested that these personality variables may beimportant only
in a context which begins with the company's organizationalstructure
and the manner in which participative budgeting is used.
Although relatively less research has been done in the area of personality attributes and budgetary effectiveness,it is quite conceivable
that this is where future research will be most effective. Characteristic
differences of users of accountinginformation have, in large part, been
ignored by the accountants who are responsible for preparing that information. The area of budgeting has been no exception.
Future research may make possible the tailoring of budget goals to
the unique personalities of individual budget holders. For example, it
was noted earlier that individualshave differentlevelsof aspirationswhen
confronted with the same budgeted goal.40 Consider the case where actual performance begins to deviate unfavorably from the aspired level
of performance. At first, the individual will make an effort to correct actual performance. If the deviation continues to increase, however, it is
likely that he will eventually reach a point of discouragement at which
he will give up trying to improve the situation. Certainly it is not in the
organization's best interest to permit a person to become so discouraged that he is no longer interested in correcting the problem.
This illustrates how individual personality differences may profoundly impact upon budgetary performance. Since individuals differ
in their ability to withstand discouragement, it follows that they cannot all be treated in the same manner with respect to budget goals. The
effective application of budgetary control, therefore, may require an intimate understanding of the unique aspiration levels, motivation structures, and other individual personality variables of the organization's
budget holders. Participation may be one effective approach to incorporating these peculiarities in the system.
I t has recently been stated that budgeting is not a mathematical
exercise performed in avacuum. I t reflects the input of individual people with unique personalities and motives, and it affects those people.
Therefore,managers must recognize the human dimensions of budgeting
procedures not only to ensure that the process is as unbiased as possible but also to limit the negative consequences of administering the
budgeting function ineffectively.41
This article has addressed the question of whether or not participative budgeting has a significant positive impact on the motivations
of budget participants. The dependent variable under study was purposely stated simply as "participant motivations," with no expressed
intention of addressinga specificmotivational object. The study did not
confineitself to such possibilities as "motivations to meet the budget"
or "motivations to engage in productive behavior." This approach was
chosen in order to afford a more comprehensiveanalysis of participation
rights as they impact upon various motivation objects.
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Participation Induces Motivation

Across a broad base of empirical study, the predominant finding is
that participation in setting budget goals induces participant motivations "to meet the budget." According to House's Path-Goal formulation of the expectancy model, these motivations stem from positively
valued outcomes expected to result from budget goal attainment, as well
as intrinsic valences associated with budget-directed behavior and
achievement. Some of these valued results includepromotions,bonuses,
recognition, satisfaction, and feelings of autonomy.
Of particular interest is the finding that once participation enters
the budgetary process, motivations tomeet the budget may not becongruent with organizational objectives;that is, the motivationalobjects
"to meet the budget" and "to serve the organization's best interests''
arenot necessarily equivalent concepts. It is commonly presumed that
participativebudgeting will lead to more realistic budget estimates. This
presumption stems from the fact that participants are closer to operations and thereforepossess a superiorinformation set upon which to base
forecasted amounts. The research results cited in this paper, however,
indicatethat this suppositionis erroneouswhen budgets areused as control devices (i.e., where budget variances enter into performance evaluations).Moreover,based on expectancy theory, these findings are wholly logical. As long as operatingmanagers place high positive valence on
favorable performance evaluations, it is unreasonable to expect them
to provide realisticbudget estimates if, in so doing,their evaluations are
adversely affected. Thereasonableexpectation is that managers will bias
budgeted amounts in order to promote their own self-interests.Thus,
a dysfunction exists when participative techniques are used in conjunction with budgets utilized as control devices. The prescription is as
follows: If management desires to utilize budgets primarily as planning
devices, participativetactics are beneficial; if their desireis to use budgets
for control purposes, their participative budgeting is likely to be detrirnental and should not be used
There are a host of contingent factors that must be weighed in the
decision of what amounts and forms of participation are proper in the
budgetary process. In addressing these factors, this study delineated
between those that relate to the more enduring states or characteristics
of the organization,the personal characteristicsof its members, and the
interpersonalrelationshipsbetween them. Participative budgeting appears to be more effective in decentralized organizations that practice
a style of management not characterizedas authoritarian. Theultimate
success of aparticipative budgetingprogram, however, may depend entirely on the personality attributes of its participant. For example,if the
majority of the budget holders are classified as having external locus of
control characteristics,it is doubtfulthat the participativeprograms will
be operational as a motivation device.
It is in this latter area that future research will be most effective.
Behavioral theory has been moving away from models of purported
general applicabilitytoward contingency models that are suited for particular situations. It is conceivable that some time in the future, con-
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tingency models will make possible the tailoring of budget strategies to
individual budget holder personalities. Until that time,however, the expectancy model,if properly used, can effectively accommodate strategy
design on a broader scale.
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